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Modern safety-critical systems are heterogeneous, complex, and highly dynamic. They require reliability evaluation
methods that go beyond the classical static methods such as fault trees, event trees, or reliability block diagrams.
Promising dynamic reliability analysis methods employ probabilistic model checking on various probabilistic state-
based models. However, such methods have to tackle the well-known state-space explosion problem. To compete
with this problem, reduction methods such as symmetry reduction and partial-order reduction have been successfully
applied to probabilistic models by means of discrete Markov chains or Markov decision processes. Such models are
usually specified using probabilistic programs provided in guarded command language.
In this paper, we propose two automated reduction methods for probabilistic programs that operate on a purely syn-
tactic level: reset value optimization and register allocation optimization. The presented techniques rely on concepts
well known from compiler construction such as live range analysis and register allocation through interference graph
coloring. Applied on a redundancy system model for an aircraft velocity control loop modeled in SIMULINK, we
show effectiveness of our implementation of the reduction methods. We demonstrate that model-size reductions in
three orders of magnitude are possible and show that we can achieve significant speedups for a reliability analysis.
Keywords: reduction methods, model-based stochastic analysis, probabilistic model checking, register allocation,
cyber-physical systems, SIMULINK.
1. Introduction
Probabilistic model checking (PMC, cf. [3, 14,
18]) is an automated technique to analyze stochas-
tic state-based models. Thanks to extensive tool
support, e.g., through probabilistic model check-
ers PRISM [22] and STORM [9], PMC has been
successfully applied to numerous real-world case
studies to analyze systems performance and Qual-
ity of Service. The main issue that hinders PMC
to be applicable to large-scale systems is the so-
called state-space explosion problem – the num-
ber of states grows exponentially in the num-
ber of components and variables used to model
the system. This problem arises especially when
the models are automatically generated as gener-
ators usually do not include techniques of exper-
tise applied during the modeling process towards
handcrafted models [8, 25, 29]. Thus, reduction
techniques have been investigated to reduce the
size of the model while preserving the properties
to be analyzed through PMC. Prominent exam-
ples are symmetry reduction [21] and probabilistic
partial-order reduction [4]. Also symbolic meth-
ods can compete with this problem by using con-
cise model representations, e.g., through binary
decision diagrams (BDDs, cf. [3, 24]).
Models for PMC tools are usually provided
through a probabilistic variant of Dijkstra’s
guarded command language [10], which we call
probabilistic programs in this paper. Existing re-
duction methods are exploiting structural proper-
ties on the semantics of probabilistic programs,
e.g., on discrete Markov chains (DTMCs) [20] or
Markov decision processes (MDPs) [27].
In this paper, we present two reduction meth-
ods that operate on a purely syntactic level of
probabilistic programs: reset value optimization
(RVO) and register allocation optimization (RAO).
To the best of our knowledge, there are no publi-
cations yet that report on automated syntactic re-
duction methods for probabilistic programs. For
both methods we employ standard concepts from
compiler construction and optimization [2] such
as live range analysis and register allocation. A
variable in a program is considered to be dead
during a program execution when it not accessed
anymore in a future step. The reduction poten-
tial then lays in the fact that the value of dead
variables does not influence the future behavior
of the program. Specifically, RVO rewrites vari-
ables to their initial value as soon as they be-
come dead. In [12] we already used this con-
cept in a handcrafted fashion to reduce the size
of probabilistic program models, not exploiting
the full reduction potential. We present a gener-
alized and automated algorithm here in this pa-
per. RVO is appealing due to its relatively simple
concept and implementation. Differently, RAO is
a more sophisticated reduction method that relies
on register allocation algorithms, i.e., algorithms
that help to assign a large number of target pro-
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gram variables onto a bounded number of CPU
registers. Well-known methods are for instance
Chaitin’s algorithm [7] and the linear scan algo-
rithm (LSA) [26]. Chaitin’s algorithm reduces the
problem of register allocation to a graph-coloring
problem (see, e.g., [17]) and is well-known for its
good minimization properties, while the LSA is
widely used in compilers where speed is key (e.g.,
for run-time compilation). Within RAO, we use
register allocation to determine those variables in
the probabilistic program that can be merged with-
out changing the program’s behavior w.r.t. the
properties to be analyzed. As the main bottle neck
of PMC is the state-space explosion problem, we
focus on Chaitin’s algorithm in this paper to in-
crease the reduction potential of RAO.
Our work has been mainly motivated by the
need of reduction methods for automatically gen-
erated PRISM models for reliability analysis,
which turned out to either being not constructible
due to memory constraints or where a reliabil-
ity analysis clearly exceeds reasonable time lim-
its [12]. While our reduction methods are appli-
cable to a wide range of probabilistic programs,
we present the algorithms in detail for probabilis-
tic control-flow programs, which is an important
subclass of probabilistic programs that arises in
many applications. Such programs have dedicated
control-flow variable storing the current control-
flow location. Although not explicitly stated,
many probabilistic program models analyzed in
the PMC community have such a variable, formal-
izing discrete time steps or rounds in protocol de-
scriptions.
We formally define RVO and RAO for proba-
bilistic control-flow programs and present an im-
plementation of both reduction methods, which
we evaluate on a large-scale redundancy system
that stems from an aircraft velocity control loop
(VCL) [12]. The VCL is based on a SIMULINK
model [1, 28] that is automatically transformed to
a probabilistic control-flow program by the reli-
ability analysis tool OPENERRORPRO [25]. Our
experiments show that the state space of the VCL
model can be reduced by a factor of 477 by
RVO and 1133 by RAO. Together with symbolic
analysis techniques and iterative variable reorder-
ing [13] that are required for model construction
due to the massive model sizes, we also gain
speedups for reliability analysis with a factor of
1.6 by RVO and 5.1 by RAO.
2. Foundations
In this section we briefly introduce notations used
throughout the paper, provide notion of programs,
and adapt well-known live range analysis to this
notion.
For a given setX we denote by ℘ (X) its power
set, i.e., the set of all subsets of X , and by |X| the
number of elements inX . LetX , Y , andZ be sets
withX ⊆ Y . For a function f : Y → Z we denote
by f(X) = {z ∈ Z : ∃x ∈ X.f(x) = z}. With
f−1 : Z → ℘ (Y ) we denote the inverse function
that given z ∈ Z returns {y ∈ Y : f(y) = z}. A
function η : Var → Z over a finite set of variables
Var is called a variable evaluation. We denote
by Eval(Var) the set of variable evaluations over
Var . A guard over Var is a Boolean expression
over arithmetic constraints over Var , e.g.,
γ = (x > 1) ∧ (y ≤ x+ 5)
is a guard over variables x, y ∈ Var . By G(Var)
we denote the set of guards over Var . Whether
a guard is fulfilled in a given variable evaluation
is determined in the standard way, e.g., the guard
γ above is fulfilled in any η ∈ Eval(Var) with
x, y ∈ Var where η(x) > 1 and η(y) ≤ η(x)+ 5.
We denote by [[γ]] ⊆ Eval(Var) the set of variable
evaluations that fulfill γ.
2.1. Probabilistic Control-Flow Programs
The basis for our reduction methods is provided
by probabilistic control-flow programs, which we
simply also call programs. They are a probabilis-
tic version of Dijksta’s guarded command lan-
guage [10] with a dedicated control-flow mecha-
nism and constitute a subset of the input language
of the probabilistic model checker PRISM [22].
Specifically, a program is a tuple
Prog =
(
Var , C, ι
)
where Var and C are finite sets of variables and
commands, respectively, and ι ∈ G(Var) is a
guard that specifies a set of initial variable evalua-
tions [[ι]] ⊆ Eval(Var). We assume a dedicated
control-flow variable cf to be not contained in
Var . A command is an expression of the form
(cf=`) ∧ guard →
p1:update1 + . . . + pn:updaten
where ` ∈ N is a control-flow location, guard ∈
G(Var), and pi:updatei are stochastic updates
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The latter comprise expres-
sions pi that describe how likely it is to change
variables according to an update
updatei = [cf:=`
′, x1:=e1, . . . , xk:=ek].
Here, the update formalizes the change of the con-
trol flow from location ` to location `′ and the
variables xj ∈ Var for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} are up-
dated with the evaluated value of the expression
ej . In each update, each variable is updated at
most once. We require that for every variable eval-
uation that fulfills guard the evaluations of the
expressions p1, p2, . . . , pn constitute a probability
distribution, i.e., sum up to 1. The size of a pro-
gram is the length of a string that arises from writ-
ing all variables, commands, and the initial guard
in sequel.
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Intuitively, a program defines a state-based se-
mantics where states comprise control-flow lo-
cations and variable evaluations in Eval(Var).
Starting in a control-flow location cf = 0 and
variable evaluation η ∈ [[ι]], commands specify
how to switch from one state to another: In case
the guard of a command is fulfilled in the current
variable evaluation, the command is considered to
be enabled. Within the set of enabled commands,
a fair coin is tossed to select a command for ex-
ecution, leading to a transition into a successor
state by updating variables according to the com-
mand’s stochastic updates. To provide an exam-
ple of stochastic updates, let us consider a com-
mand as above to be enabled in a variable evalu-
ation η ∈ Eval(Var). For some i ∈ {1, ..., n},
assume pi = x/(1 + x) and
updatei = [cf:=2, x:=1 + y]
By executing this command the value of variable
x is set to the increment of the value of variable
y with a probability of x1+x . With probability 1−
x
1+x , other updates of the command are applied.
In this sense, programs describe stochastic
state-based models by means of discrete Markov
chains (DTMCs). We denote by PrProg,η the stan-
dard probability measure defined over measurable
sets of executions in the DTMC semantics of a
program Prog starting in a variable evaluation η.
For further details on such models and their use
in the context of verification, we refer to standard
textbooks such as [3, 20]. Programs used as input
of PRISM further specify bounded intervals of
integers as domains of variables, guaranteeing
that the arising DTMC is finite.
Auxiliary Functions. Let c ∈ C be a command
of a program Prog as defined above. We say that a
variable is written in c if there is an update for in c,
and read when the variable appears in some guard,
probability expression, or used in an expression to
update a possibly different variable in c. We de-
note by r,w : C → ℘ (Var) functions that return
those variables r(c) read in c and those variables
w(c) written in every update of c, respectively.
We define a function cf : C → Z that pro-
vides for each command c the control-flow loca-
tion cf(c) in which c is enabled. The functions
pred, succ : C → ℘ (C) applied on c return ex-
actly those commands c′ ∈ pred(c) that have a
control-flow update to a control-flow location in
cf(c) and those commands c′′ ∈ succ(c) where
c has a control-flow update to some control-flow
location in cf(c′′).
Property Specification. Programs as above can
be subject to a quantitative analysis, e.g., through
probabilistic model checking by PRISM. Usu-
ally, properties are specified in temporal logics
over a set of atomic propositions AP , assuming
states in the model to be labeled using a func-
tion λ : AP → G(Var∪{cf}). For instance,
fail ∈ AP could stand for all failure states,
i.e., all η ∈ Eval(Var∪{cf}) that fulfill the label
guard λ(fail). In this paper, we mainly focus
on reachability properties such as ♦fail, consti-
tuting the set of all program executions that reach
a failure state. It is well known that such reacha-
bility properties are measurable in the DTMC se-
mantics of programs (cf. [20]). Bounded reach-
ability properties such as ♦<kfail describe all
those executions reaching a failure state within k
rounds, also measurable in this sense [5]. Here,
the number of rounds of an execution of a pro-
gram is defined as the number of returning to the
initial control-flow location cf = 0.
Example 2.1. Let us consider a program Bsp =
(Var , C, ι) where Var = {x, y}, C comprises the
commands
cf = 0 ∧ x = 1 → 1 : [cf := 1, x := 0]
cf = 1 ∧ x = 0 →
0.5 : [cf := 2, y := 0] + 0.5 : [cf := 3, y := 0]
cf = 2 → 1 : [cf := 0, x := 1]
cf = 3 →
0.3 : [cf := 0, x := 0] + 0.7 : [cf := 1, x := 0]
and ι = (x = 1 ∧ y = 1) is the guard specifying
the initial variable evaluation.
Figure 1 shows the DTMC semantics of Bsp,
having seven reachable states. As [[ι]] is a single-
ton, we only have one initial state η, highlighted
in blue. Transitions from one state to another are
depicted by arrows, illustrating the step-wise be-
havior of the program. There is one deadlock
state, i.e., a state without outgoing transitions,
with control-flow location 0 and a variable eval-
uation of x = 0 and y = 0. A reasonable property
cf=0 | x=0 | y=0
cf=0 | x=1 | y=1
cf=1 | x=0 | y=1
cf=2 | x=0 | y=0 cf=3 | x=0 | y=0
cf=1 | x=0 | y=0cf=0 | x=1 | y=0
0.5 0.5
0.30.7
1
1
1
0.5 0.5
Fig. 1. The DTMC semantics of program Bsp.
to be investigated in a reliability analysis would
be, e.g., the probability of reaching the deadlock
state within 10 rounds. Formally, this probabil-
ity would be expressed by PrProg,η[♦<10fail]
where λ(fail) = (cf = 0 ∧ x = 0).
4 Clemens Dubslaff, Andrey Morozov, Christel Baier, and Klaus Janschek
2.2. Live Range Analysis
We present here an adaption of the well-known
live range analysis (see, e.g., [2]) to guarded com-
mand languages by means of programs. Intu-
itively, a variable is considered to be live in a vari-
able evaluation of the program if there is an exe-
cution where the variable is not written until it is
read. As we are interested in reduction methods
on a syntactic level, we define an approach based
on commands rather than on variable evaluations.
Assume we have given a program Prog as de-
fined in the last section. By Algorithm 1 we de-
fine a function live : C → ℘ (Var) that returns
a set of live variables live(c) for any command
c ∈ C. The function live is a conservative under-
approximation of liveness based on variable eval-
uations in the sense that there could be variable
evaluations η where a command cwith v ∈ live(c)
is enabled but v is not live in η. It is easy to see
Algorithm 1: Live range analysis (LRA)
input : Prog = (Var , C, ι)
output: LRA(Prog) : C → ℘ (Var)
1 live := r
2 U := C
3 while U 6= ∅ do
4 Pick a command c′ ∈ U
5 U := U \ {c′}
6 forall c ∈ pred(c′) do
7 I := live(c) ∪ (live(c′) \ w(c))
8 if I 6= live(c) then
9 live(c) := I
10 U := U ∪ {c}
11 return live
that Algorithm 1 terminates as in every iteration of
the while loop (line 3-10) either at least one new
live variable is added to a command or the size of
U decreases. Furthermore, Algorithm 1 runs in
polynomial time in the size of the input program.
2.3. Graph Coloring
Let us revisit notions for coloring graphs. A graph
is a pair G = (V,E) where V is a finite set of ver-
tices V and E ⊆ ℘ (V ) is a set of edges where
for each e ∈ E we have |e| = 2. Given a graph
G = (V,E) and an integer k ∈ N, a function
f : V → {1, . . . , k} is a k-coloring of G if for
all {x, y} ∈ E we have that f(x) 6= f(y). We
call k ∈ N for which there is a k-coloring of G
minimal if there is no k′ ∈ N with k′ < k where
there is a k′-coloring of G. It is well known that
the question whether some k ∈ N is minimal is
NP-hard [17]. To this end, many heuristic have
been proposed to determine nearly minimal graph
colorings in reasonable time. In this paper we rely
on a greedy heuristics for graph coloring that runs
in quadratic time and is due to Welsh and Pow-
ell [30], listed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Welsh-Powell algorithm
input : G = (V,E), V = {1, . . . , n}
output: WP(G) : V → {1, . . . , n}
1 forall v ∈ V do
2 f(v) := 0
3 d(v) := |{{v, v′} ∈ E : v′ ∈ V }|
4 Let o : {1, . . . , n} → V such that
d(o(i)) ≥ d(o(j)) for all 1≤i≤j≤n
5 for c := 1, . . . , n do
6 for i := 1, . . . , n, f(o(i)) = 0 do
7 if @v.{o(i), v} ∈ E ∧ f(v)=c then
8 f(o(i)) = c
9 return f
3. Reset Value Optimization
The basic idea behind reset value optimization
(RVO) [12, 16] is to update variables with a de-
fault value as soon as they are not live anymore.
This approach has the advantage of being rela-
tively easy to apply on programs even when per-
formed by hand, as after a simple live range analy-
sis it mainly operates locally on commands. Even
though it is surprisingly effective.
Algorithm 3 shows the pseudo code of RVO.
Besides a program Prog as introduced in Sec-
Algorithm 3: RVO
input : Prog = (Var , C, ι); ρ ∈ Eval(Var);
Ex ⊆ Var
output: Prog′ = (Var , C ′, ι)
1 live := LRA(Prog)
2 C ′ := ∅
3 forall c ∈ C do
4 c′ = c
5 forall p:[cf:=`, xu] in c do
6 L := live(c)\Ex
7 forall s ∈ C with cf(s) = ` do
8 L := L\live(s)
9 forall x ∈ L do
10 if there is x := e in xu then
11 replace x := e in xu of c′ by
x := ρ(x)
12 else
13 add x := ρ(x) to xu in c′
14 C ′ := C ′ ∪ {c′}
15 return (Var , C ′, ι)
tion 2.1, it takes a variable evaluation ρ and a set of
variablesEx as input. While ρ specifies the values
the variables are reset to, Ex specifies the vari-
ables that should be excluded from the optimiza-
tion, i.e., not reset. Exclusion of variables is re-
quired to guarantee bisimilarity [23] w.r.t. atomic-
proposition labeling used in properties for analyz-
ing the system. For instance, assume a variable
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v that is initially 0 and is set to 1 when a failure
fail occurred. In case v is set to 1 in the first
round of executing Prog, never read again, and no
further failure occurs, this variable would eventu-
ally be reset to 0 in a program Prog′ that results
from RVO on Prog. However, it might be that
PrProg,η[♦<2fail] 6= PrProg′,η[♦<2fail] as an
execution fulfilling ♦<2fail in Prog might be
not present in Prog′.
Algorithm 3 iterates through all updates in com-
mands of the program and modifies them depend-
ing on a live range analysis (line 5-13): First, the
variables that are live in the command’s updates
and can serve as reset candidates are stored in a
set L (line 6). Then, all live variables in com-
mands that have a control-flow location that is set
by the update are disregarded from L (line 7-8),
as these are those variables that are further live af-
ter the update and hence, the value of these vari-
ables matter in future steps. When there are any
variables x in L after the removal of future live
variables, then these variables can be set to any
value without changing the behavior of the pro-
gram. This is done in line 9 and following. In
case there is already an update of the variable x in
the list of updates xu, then this update is replaced
by x := ρ(x) (line 11), and otherwise x := ρ(x)
is added to the list of updates xu (line 13). It is
easy to see that Algorithm 3 terminates and runs
in polynomial time as C is finite and C ′ strictly
increases every step until |C ′| = |C|.
Theorem 3.1. Let Prog = (Var , C, ι) a program,
Ex ⊆ Var , fail ∈ G(Ex), k ∈ N, and Prog′
the program obtained from applying Algorithm 3
on Prog, Ex, and some ρ ∈ Eval(Var). Then for
every η ∈ [[ι]]
PrProg,η[♦<kfail] = PrProg′,η[♦<kfail].
Example 3.1. Let us return to our example pro-
gram introduced in Example 2.1. After applying
Algorithm 3 on Bsp = (Var , C, ι) with Ex = ∅
and ρ ∈ [[ι]] (recall that ρ is uniquely defined as
[[ι]] is a singleton) we obtain a program Bsp′ =
(Var , C ′, ι) where C ′ comprises commands
cf = 0 ∧ x = 1 → 1 : [cf := 1, x := 0]
cf = 1 ∧ x = 0 →
0.5 : [cf := 2, x := 1, y := 0] +
0.5 : [cf := 3, x := 1, y := 0]
cf = 2 → 1 : [cf := 0, x := 1, y := 1]
cf = 3 →
0.3 : [cf := 0, x := 0] + 0.7 : [cf := 1, x := 0]
In the above commands, we highlighted the
changes of the updates in red. According to the
program logic, the variable x is not used after
the execution of the command that is enabled in
control-flow location cf = 1, since x is not in
any guard of commands with control-flow loca-
tions cf = 2 and cf = 3 where in both cases the
value of x is updated. To this end, we can explic-
itly reset it to the initial value 1 without changing
the program behavior. Likewise, variable y can be
reset to 1 in the command with cf = 2, as y is not
part of the guard of the command with cf = 0
and is updated in the command of cf = 1. Fig-
ure 2 shows the DTMC semantics of Bsp′. While
cf=0 | x=0 | y=0
cf=0 | x=1 | y=1
cf=1 | x=0 | y=1
cf=2 | x=1 | y=0 cf=3 | x=1 | y=0
cf=1 | x=0 | y=0
0.5 0.5
0.30.7
1
1
0.5 0.5
Fig. 2. The DTMC semantics of program Bsp after RVO.
the DTMC semantics of Bsp had seven states, the
DTMC of Figure 2 has only six states, witnessing
the potential of reduction using RVO.
4. Register Allocation Optimization
Ideas from register allocation [2] can be used to re-
duce the number of variables in a program specifi-
cation without changing the program’s properties,
i.e., strive towards a bisimilar program of reduced
size. Within register allocation, the task is to as-
sign variables to a bounded number of resources
in terms of memory cells. In contrast to classical
register-allocation algorithms, we do not consider
a strict bound on the number of memory cells but
want to minimize its number, hence not relying
on spilling techniques. We adopt Chaitin’s algo-
rithm [7] known for its good minimizations based
on coloring interference graphs.
4.1. Interference Graph Coloring
Let Prog = (Var , C, ι) a program. The inter-
ference graph (IG) of Prog is a graph GProg =
(Var , E) where e = {x, y} ∈ E iff
(a) e ⊆ live(cf−1(0)) or
(b) there is a c ∈ C with e ⊆ live(succ(c)).
Stated in words, two variables in the IG are con-
nected in case they are not simultaneously live in
either the initial commands or while executing a
command. This intuitively means that one cannot
use the same memory cell to store both variables,
i.e., cannot merge them. The construction of IG is
doable in time polynomial in the size of Prog.
To obtain sets of variables that can be merged,
the idea is to determine a coloring of the IG and
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merge x, y ∈ Var in case x and y have the same
color. For obtaining a graph coloring with a nearly
minimal number of colors, we rely on the Welsh-
Powell heuristics provided in Algorithm 2.
4.2. Variable Merging
Algorithm 4 shows our register allocation opti-
mization based on a given coloring of the pro-
gram’s IG. As within RVO presented in Algo-
rithm 3, this algorithm takes as input also a set
of variables Ex ⊆ Var to be excluded from
optimization to ensure bisimilarity w.r.t. atomic
propositions used in property specifications.
Algorithm 4: RAO
input : Prog = (Var , C, ι); Ex ⊆ Var
output: Prog′ = (Var ′, C ′, ι′)
1 wp :=WP(GProg)
2 Var ′ = Ex ∪ {vi : ∃v, i.wp(v) = i}
3 C ′ := C, ι′ := ι
4 forall v ∈ Var\Ex do
5 replace v in C ′ and ι′ by vwp(v)
6 return (Var ′, C ′, ι′)
In line 1, we apply Algorithm 2 on the IG of
the input program Prog. Line 2 specifies the new
set of variables Var ′ as the excluded variables Ex
from Var (to guarantee correctness of analysis re-
sults w.r.t. properties over G(Ex)) and merged
variables. The rest of the algorithm simply re-
places any occurrence of variables not excluded
from optimization by their merged counterparts.
Algorithm 4 runs in polynomial time as its com-
plexity is dominated by the live range analysis
(see Algorithm 1), the construction of IG, and the
Welsh-Powell algorithm (see Algorithm 2).
Theorem 4.1. Let Prog = (Var , C, ι) a program,
Ex ⊆ Var , fail ∈ G(Ex), k ∈ N, and Prog′
the program obtained from applying Algorithm 4
on Prog and Ex. Then for every η ∈ [[ι]]
PrProg,η[♦<kfail] = PrProg′,η[♦<kfail].
Example 4.1. Let us again return to our example
program introduced in Example 2.1. After apply-
ing Algorithm 4 on Bsp = (Var , C, ι) with Ex =
∅ we obtain a program Bsp′ = (Var ′, C ′, ι′)
where Var = {xy}, ι′ = (xy = 1), and C ′ com-
prises the commands
cf = 0 ∧ xy = 1 → 1 : [cf := 1, xy := 0]
cf = 1 ∧ xy = 0 →
0.5 : [cf := 2, xy := 0] +
0.5 : [cf := 3, xy := 0]
cf = 2 → 1 : [cf := 0, xy := 1]
cf = 3 → 0.3 : [cf := 0, xy := 0] +
0.7 : [cf := 1, xy := 0]
Again, we highlighted the changes of the com-
mands compared to Bsp in red. Already in Ex-
ample 3.1, we saw that x and y do not interfere
in resets and the use of them in guards. It is
hence not too surprising that we can merge them
into one variable v1 = xy according to Algo-
rithm 4. Figure 3 shows the DTMC semantics of
Bsp′. The arising DTMC has even one state less
cf=0 | xy=0
cf=0 | xy=1
cf=1 | xy=0
cf=2 | xy=0 cf=3 | xy=0
0.5 0.5
0.3
0.7
1
1
Fig. 3. The DTMC semantics of program Bsp after RAO.
than the DTMC obtained after application of RVO
(see Figure 2), showing the potential of even fur-
ther reductions on programs through RAO.
5. Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented both reduction methods as
Python programs that accept a model in the in-
put language of the prominent probabilistic model
checker PRISM [22], together with a variable used
as control-flow variable, and a set of variables to
be excluded from the optimization.
The VCL model. We applied our reduction
methods on a simplified version of the aircraft
model borrowed from the SIMULINK example
set [1] that itself is based on a long-haul passen-
ger aircraft flying at cruising altitude and speed,
adjusting the fuel flow rate to control the aircraft
velocity. Following the approach of [12], we
generated a model family that includes options
to protect SIMULINK blocks via redundancy
mechanisms to increase fault tolerance of the
velocity control loop (VCL). Specifically, we
considered 13 SIMULINK blocks protectable with
comparison: The block is duplicated and both
outputs are compared. In case their output differs
a dedicated failure state is reached. Otherwise,
the output is the one of both blocks.
voting: Following the principle of triple modular
redundancy principle, the block is triplicated and
the output is based on a majority decision.
The arising model comprises 313 = 1594 323
different variants of the VCL. Using
OPENERRORPRO [25], we automatically
generated a PRISM model on which we applied
the reduction methods RVO and RAO presented
in this paper. Here, we modeled errors that could
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Table 1. Statistics of the reliability analysis experiments
reduction model size reduction times [s] speedup
method states nodes states nodes IVR build analysis
∑
no 4.87·1013 301 733 - - 1895.6 708.6 1 226.2 3 830.4 -
RVO 1.02·1011 233 020 477.3 1.3 270.4 275.5 915.0 1 190.4 3.2
RAO 4.30·1010 121 426 1 133.1 2.5 125.8 82.3 296.8 379.1 10.1
appear during the execution of a SIMULINK block
function, e.g., caused by a bit-flip in a CPU. The
occurrence of such an error is determined stochas-
tically with the probabilities that depend on the
commands in the SIMULINK block functions.
Even after the reductions, the model could not
immediately be constructed by PRISM’s symbolic
engine. This was as expected, since also the VCL
model considered in [12] could not be constructed
ad-hoc even given the model presented there
considered only eight block to be protectable. We
hence applied a method called iterative variable
reordering (IVR) [13] to enable model construc-
tion. It is well known that symbolic methods
based on BDDs [24] as used in PRISM’s symbolic
engine are sensitive to the so-called variable
order. The main idea behind IVR is to iteratively
enlarge the system family and perform variable
reorderings at each step to eventually obtain a
suitable variable order for the whole system fam-
ily. Specifically, we applied the automated IVR
method presented in [13], following a ρ-maximal
selection heuristics with step size four and using
the variable reordering implementation of [19].
Table 1 shows statistics of the arising model sizes
and construction timings. While the number of
nodes used to represent the model symbolically is
not significantly reduced, the explicit state-space
representation could be reduced drastically in 2-3
orders of magnitude.
Reliability analysis. We performed a reliability
analysis on the constructed VCL model family
to determine the probability of the system to fail
within two rounds of execution. All experiments
were carried out on a Linux server system (2× In-
tel Xeon E5-2680 (Octa Core, Sandy Bridge) run-
ning at 2.70 GHz with 384 GB of RAM; Turbo
Boost and Hyper Threading disabled; Debian
GNU/Linux 9.1) with a memory bound of 30 GB
of RAM, running the symbolic MTBDD engine of
the PRISM version presented in [19]. Specifically,
we computed PrVCL,pi(♦<2fail) for every pro-
tection combination pi using a family-based all-in-
one analysis [11]. The results range from 0.435
probability to fail with no protection mechanism
and 0.019 with all 13 blocks protected. Table 1
shows the timing statistics of the analysis where
an overall speedup of an order of magnitude turns
out to be possible with our reduction methods.
Comparison to [12]. In [12] we proposed to use
family-based methods for the analysis of redun-
dancy systems modeled in SIMULINK, issuing a
VCL model family with eight blocks eligible for
protection and four protection mechanisms. This
led to a family size of 48 = 65 536. There, we
applied preliminary versions of IVR and RVO in
a handcrafted fashion, not exploiting their full po-
tential, e.g., leaving out variables that could pos-
sibly reset. In this paper, automated techniques
enabled us to perform a reliability analysis on a
much bigger instance with 313 family members.
6. Discussion and Further Work
To the best of our knowledge, we were the first
presenting fully automated reduction methods for
probabilistic programs that purely operate on a
syntactic level. The presented approaches are not
only applicable to PRISM programs with a ded-
icated formalism of control flow, but also to ar-
bitrary PRISM programs. However, such opti-
mizations might be not as effective since LRA
heavily relies on the concept of control flows.
In this sense, although we applied our methods
on DTMC models only, they can be also useful
for other models expressed in PRISM’s input lan-
guage, e.g., Markov decision processes. Further,
our methods yield bisimilar models for arbitrary
temporal logical formulas expressed over the set
of excluded variables. Since we strived towards
reliability analysis, we presented the approach in
a simpler form of reward-bounded reachability
properties. Although RVO uses Chaitin’s algo-
rithm, we could use our methods also with the lin-
ear scan algorithm (LSA) [26], e.g., to enable fast
reduction methods for runtime verification [15].
When bounded model checking [6] is used as
analysis method, an idea is to adapt LRA such that
it considers live ranges up to the desired model-
checking bound. We showed that our methods
are effective especially when explicit model rep-
resentations are used. As explicit model-checking
methods are well known to be faster than symbolic
methods when applied on relatively small models,
we expect also such models to benefit from our
reduction methods presented.
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